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Abstract
We develop a theory and empirical test of how the legal system aﬀects the relation-
ship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. The theory uses a double moral
hazard framework to show how optimal contracts and investor actions depend on the
quality of the legal system. The empirical evidence is based on a sample of European
venture capital deals. The main results are that with better legal protection, investors
give more non-contractible support and demand more downside protection. These
predictions are supported by the empirical analysis. Using a new empirical approach
of comparing two sets of ﬁxed-eﬀect regressions, we also ﬁnd that the investor’s legal
system is more important than that of the company in determining investor behavior.
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The work of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000) demonstrates the importance of the le-
gal system for economic activity. Their work, and a large ensuing literature shows that
countries with diﬀerent legal origins also systematically diﬀer in terms of their ﬁnancial
systems. In this paper we ask how ﬁnancial intermediation is aﬀected by the nature
of the legal system, focusing speciﬁcally on venture capital. We look at how the entire
relationship–contractual and non-contractual– between an investor and an entrepreneur
depends on the legal system.
Since it is not immediately obvious how the legal system should aﬀect this relation-
ship, we let our analysis be guided by theory. We examine how optimal contracts, and
the resulting investor behavior, depend on the legal system. We propose a simple theory
that makes three predictions. First, the better the legal system the more investors provide
value-adding support. The underlying intuition is that investing in support activities is
only worthwhile if the legal system provides investors with suﬃcient guarantees that these
eﬀorts will not be wasted. Second, the better the legal system the more they demand con-
tractual downside protection, using securities such as debt, convertible debt, or preferred
equity. The main intuition is that in a better legal system it is optimal to give the entrepre-
neur stronger upside incentives. In order to satisfy their participation constraint, investors
thus require additional cash ﬂow rights on the downside. Third, we consider the inﬂuence
of the legal system on intermediaries’ incentives to develop the competencies necessary to
provide value added services, predicting that intermediaries from countries with a better
legal system will provide more value added services, even when investing abroad.
To test the predictions of the theory, we use a hand-collected dataset on European
venture capital investments for the period 1998-2001. We focus on venture capital as a
specialized form of ﬁnancial intermediation because prior research has already established
the richness of relationships between venture capital ﬁrms and their companies.1 Venture
capital investors can play a value-adding role in the companies they ﬁnance, both through
contracting and by providing largely non-contractible inputs such as advice and support.
Europe is an excellent testing ground for our purposes, since it consists of a set of com-
parable countries with reasonably mature venture capital markets, yet it features a rich
variety of legal systems.
Our sample consists of 1,431 venture deals from 124 venture capital ﬁrms in 17 Euro-
pean countries. Our primary data source is a comprehensive survey of all venture capital
ﬁrms in these countries. We augmented the data with numerous secondary sources, includ-
1Throughout the paper we reserve the term ’ﬁrm’ for the investor (i.e., the venture capital ﬁrm) and
the term ’company’ to the company that receives venture ﬁnancing.
1ing commercial databases and websites. This data collection eﬀort required considerable
time and eﬀort but allowed us to gather a dataset that has several unique advantages.
The dataset is considerably larger than other hand-collected datasets on venture capital,
and is much richer than the commercially available databases; it also contains a signiﬁ-
cant number of investments that cross diﬀerent legal systems. Moreover, it allows us to
introduce to the literature a novel measure of the intensity of interactions between venture
capitalists and entrepreneurs, a measure that cannot be obtained from standard sources
of venture capital data (such as VenturExpert), nor from venture capital contracts.
We ﬁnd clear empirical support for our theoretical predictions. Better legal systems are
associated with more investor involvement and more downside protection for the investors.
The results hold for legal origin, using the standard interpretation that the Anglo-Saxon
common law system is better for investors than systems based on civil law. They also hold
for two widely used index measures of the quality of the legal system: the rule of law and
the degree of legal procedural complexity.
Our data allows us to examine whether the eﬀects of legal systems come through
the company or the investor, an issue that has not yet been fully answered in the prior
literature. We introduce a novel empirical approach of determining the relative importance
of company and investor legal system eﬀects comparing two sets of regressions: one with
company legal system variables and investor country ﬁxed eﬀect controls, the other with
investor legal system variables and company country ﬁxed eﬀect controls. We ﬁnd that
company legal system eﬀects are not robust to the introduction of investor country ﬁxed
eﬀects, but that investor legal system eﬀects are robust to the introduction of company
country ﬁxed eﬀects. These results are consistent with the theoretical model prediction
that investors from countries with stronger legal protection provide more support and
demand more downside protection. They suggest that the legal system aﬀects ﬁnancial
transactions not only directly, but also indirectly by aﬀecting the practices adopted by
ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Our results provide new insights into how legal systems aﬀect ﬁnancial intermediation.
In particular, they point to the importance of considering the relationship between investor
and entrepreneur in its entirety, accounting both for contractual and non-contractual as-
pects. Moreover, the analysis shows how the legal system aﬀects not only contracts, but
also investors’ actions and their investment styles. These ﬁndings also have implications
for our understanding of cross country diﬀerences in ﬁnancial intermediation. We discuss
these implications, and their relevance for policy, in the main body of the paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 addresses the relationship with the liter-
ature. Section 3 develops the theoretical model. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5
discusses the empirical results. It is followed by a brief conclusion.
22 Related Literature
A few theoretical papers have begun to explore the relationship between legal systems
and corporate ﬁnance choices. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) examine a model where an
entrepreneur wants to divert funds for private use. They show how the strength of the
legal system aﬀects the willingness to go public, and thus the equilibrium size of the
capital market. Burkhart et al. (2003) consider how the legal system aﬀects a manager’s
ability to divert funds. They show that the willingness of an owner to delegate control to
a manager and to sell shares to outsiders depends on the quality of the legal system. In a
related vein, Burkhart and Panunzi (2006) consider the eﬀect of shareholder protection on
managerial incentives, monitoring and ownership concentration. Bergman and Nicolaievski
(2007) develop a model where the quality of the judicial system drives the quality of
enforcement. We are not aware of any theory paper that speciﬁcally addresses the role of
the legal system for the non-contractual aspects of ﬁnancial intermediation.
Our theory examines the relative use of debt and equity as a function of the quality of
legal systems. It seems natural to relate this to the literature on costly state veriﬁcation
(Gale and Hellwig (1985)), which has argued that debt is an optimal instrument when the
cost of verifying (and thus enforcing) state-contingent returns is high. This line of argument
would suggest that debt is more important in poorer legal systems. However, upon closer
inspection, this line of argument does not apply as much to our context. Venture capitalists
fundamentally are equity investors, because their ability to write state-contingent contracts
is a requisite for eﬃcient contracting. Our analysis therefore focuses on an environment
where the legal system is suﬃciently good to allow for state-contingent contracts. The
question we are asking then is not whether equity investors want to switch to debt, but
whether equity investors want to add some debt. One of the interesting insights that we
obtain from the model is an explanation of why this augmentative use of debt might
actually be associated with better legal systems.
Because the theoretical literature remains under-developed, much of the empirical liter-
ature on legal system eﬀects has focused on documenting empirical regularities. Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), examine the eﬀects of legal systems on ﬁnancial or economic
outcomes, providing evidence on the link between legal origin, ﬁnancial institutions and
company growth. Qian and Strahan (2007) look at how legal origin aﬀects the design of
bank loan contracts. Himmelberg et al. (2002) examine the eﬀect of investor protection on
ﬁrms’ cost of capital. Desai et al. (2005) examine the relationship between legal systems
and ﬁrm dynamics, including entry and exit rates.
Our analysis also builds on the recent empirical venture capital literature, which ex-
amines both the contractible and non-contractible interactions between investors and en-
3trepreneurs. See in particular Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2007, 2008), Cumming et
al. (2004), Gompers (1995), Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002), Hochberg (2004), Kaplan
and Strömberg (2003, 2004), Lerner (1994), Lindsey (2007), Sahlman (1990), and Sørensen
(2007).
Of particular relevance here are two recent papers based on venture capital data. Lerner
and Schoar (2005) (LS henceforth) collect a sample of 210 transactions in 26 countries,
made by 28 private equity ﬁrms, mostly between 1996 and 2001. They focus not purely
on venture capital deals, but more broadly on private equity deals. Their data are mainly
from developing, rather than developed countries, and their analysis is mainly based on
comparing common and civil law countries (as well as former socialist systems). Among
other things, they ﬁnd that in countries with better legal systems, private equity investors
switch from using simple securities, notably straight equity and debt, to using more so-
phisticated securities, such as convertible preferred stock.
Kaplan et al. (2007) (KMS henceforth) collect a sample of 145 venture deals made
by 70 venture capital ﬁrms in 107 companies in 23 non-US (largely European) countries,
mostly between 1998 and 2001. They compare these non-US investments with the US sam-
ple analyzed by Kaplan and Strömberg (2003). Their main dependent variables focus on
contractual sophistication. Among other things, they ﬁnd a positive relationship between
better legal systems and the use of convertible securities. Their central ﬁnding, however, is
that the coeﬃcients for legal systems become insigniﬁcant after controlling for investors’
sophistication. They measure sophistication by whether the investor is US-based or has
experience investing in the US venture capital market.
Our study advances the literature on several counts. First, we develop a theoretical
model that gives us a coherent framework for explaining how the legal system aﬀects
the entire ﬁnancing relationship, in terms of contracts, non-contractual actions and even
investor competencies. Second, we use a new data approach. LS and KMS gather private
equity and venture capital contracts. This has the advantage of providing very detailed
data on the contractual relationship between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur.
We choose a complementary approach of gathering survey data on venture capital activity.
This has the advantage that we can go beyond the purely contractual aspects of the
investment relationship. It also allows us to build a substantially larger sample than LS
and KMS. Third, we are able to empirically examine the non-contractual dimension of
the venture capital relationship. This component of value-adding support has been central
in much of the theoretical venture capital literature, but its behavior across countries
has not yet been studied empirically. Fourth, an interesting diﬀerence is that the prior
literature identiﬁes legal system eﬀects mainly by comparing the US (and the UK to
a limited extent) with a number of civil law countries. A potential concern is that the
4legal system eﬀects could be confounded with other US-speciﬁce ﬀects that are related
to the fact that the US is undoubtedly the market leader in venture capital. Our sample
consists entirely of European investors and companies, and thus does not contain any US
investors. Moreover, as a robustness check we perform an analysis in the subsample of
civil law countries only. Fifth, our analysis provides a novel approach for comparing the
relative importance of the companies’ versus investors’ legal system. The prior literature
focuses mostly on companies’ legal systems.2 Our analysis suggests that company legal
system eﬀects are not as robust as investor legal system eﬀects. This is an important and
novel ﬁnding that also suggests new directions for future research.
There are many similarities between our results and those of LS and KMS. For example,
all three papers ﬁnd that the use of convertible preferred securities is associated with better
legal systems. However there are also some diﬀerences.
In LS company legal eﬀects remain signiﬁcant throughout, whereas in this paper their
signiﬁcance vanishes once we control for the investor’s country. Note that one of the
advantages of having a much larger sample size is that it allows us to estimate models
with country ﬁxed eﬀects. Another diﬀerence between this paper and LS concerns the
relationship between legal systems and the use of pure debt. LS ﬁnd a negative relationship,
whereas we ﬁnd a positive relationship. The most likely explanation is sample diﬀerences,
in particular the kind of investments found in the relatively poorer legal systems. In LS,
those investments are largely made by non-venture private equity investors, who invest
in traditional sectors such as manufacturing, and who provide capital for expansion or
buyouts. The invested companies are likely to have signiﬁcant assets and therefore a higher
debt capacity. By contrast, in our sample investments are made by venture capitalists,
who largely invest in early-stage, high-technology companies with relatively few assets.
Moreover, note that in the LS sample companies face severely underdeveloped banking
systems, where the provision of standard bank loans cannot be taken for granted. Their
equity investors may have to ﬁll an additional market gap that is not present in our sample.
Similar to KMS, we also ﬁnd that company legal system eﬀects become insigniﬁcant
once we control for enough investor characteristics. One minor diﬀerence is that in our
setting we need to use investor country ﬁxed eﬀect to render company legal system eﬀects
insigniﬁcant, whereas KMS only use measures of investor sophistication, namely whether
the VC ﬁrm has experience investing in the US, or syndicating with US VC ﬁrms. In
our setting these speciﬁc measures turn out to be less important, although we ﬁnd that
having individual partners who worked in the US as venture capitalists has eﬀects similar
2Both LS and KMS contain one table where they add a dummy for whether the investor is from a
common or civil law country. In both papers this simple dummy variable turns out to be statistically
insigniﬁcant, and both papers then refrain from further investigation of investor legal system eﬀects.
5to those observed by KMS. The other diﬀerence, of course, is that our analysis emphasizes
the investor’s legal system as an important driver of investment behavior.
3T h e o r y
The main objective of the theory is to motivate the empirical analysis and provide a con-
ceptual framework for understanding the main empirical results. The model is based on
the double moral hazard problem which has become the workhorse of the theoretical ven-
ture capital literature (Casamatta (2003), Cestone (2004), Hellmann (1998, 2006), Inderst
and Müller (2004), Repullo and Suarez (2004), Schmidt (2003)). Our main theoretical
contribution is to introduce legal systems issue into such a double moral hazard model.
3.1 Assumptions
Consider an entrepreneur who requires an investment amount kV to start a company.
The entrepreneur is wealth constrained and her opportunity cost of doing the venture
is given by kE. With probability (1 − p) the company is a failure, and it is unable to
generate any cash ﬂows. Still, the company will have some assets, that have a value a.F o r
simplicity we assume that assets cannot be stolen.3 With probability p,t h ec o m p a n yi sa
success, generating additional cash ﬂows π. However, whether these cash ﬂows are divided
according to the contract depends on the quality of the legal systems of the two contracting
parties. We assume that with probability μE the entrepreneur identiﬁes a weakness in the
legal system that allows her to divert the cash ﬂows π into her pockets. Similarly, with
probability μV the investor identiﬁes a weakness in the legal system that allows him to
divert the cash ﬂows π into his pockets. Naturally we assume μE +μV ≤ 1.I ti sn a t u r a lt o
associate these probabilities with the qualities of the respective legal systems. The better
the entrepreneur’s (investor’s) legal system, the less likely she (he) is able to identify such
a weakness, and thus the lower μE (μV ).
For the double moral hazard problem, we use a tractable linear-quadratic speciﬁcation,
where the probability of generating additional cash ﬂo w si sg i v e nb y :
p = p0 + pEe + pV v.
Let e measure the non-contractible eﬀort of the entrepreneur, and v measure the amount
3This assumption simpliﬁes the exposition. It is easy to verify that it does not aﬀect any of the results.
Allowing asset stealing would not aﬀect incentives but create additional ineﬃciencies. It would therefore
only reduce the range of parameters for which ﬁnancing is feasible in the ﬁrst place.
6of non-contractible value-adding support of the venture capitalist. We assume quadratic
private eﬀort costs cE = e2/2 and cV = v2/2. The parameters pE and pV measure the
relative importance or ability of the entrepreneur and venture capitalist. Throughout we
assume that p0, pE and pV are suﬃciently small to ensure that p<1 - the appendix
derives the formal condition for this.
In this simple model, the value of the company can only take two values: a + π on
the upside, and a on the downside. The venture capitalist’s cash ﬂow rights are linear, so
that w.l.o.g. they can be expressed as a combination of (safe) debt and (risky) equity. Let
d denote the face value of debt, and s the venture capitalist’s equity share. The venture
capitalist receives d + s(a − d) o nt h ed o w n s i d ea n dd + s(π + a − d) on the upside.4
We assume that stealing is risky or otherwise costly, so that the entrepreneur’s expected
returns from stealing are given by (1 − φ)π,w h e r eφπ measures the net cost of stealing.5
For φ>sthe entrepreneur would never want to steal, since the returns from stealing are
lower than the returns from sharing cash ﬂows according to the contract. Similarly, for
(1−φ) <sthe investor would never want to steal. We focus on the non-trivial case where
φ<s<1 − φ, so that both parties always prefer stealing over sharing. This condition is
naturally satisﬁed for suﬃciently low values of φ.
Let uE and uV denote the utilities of the entrepreneur and venture capitalist, respec-
tively. Then:
uE =( 1− s)(a − d)+pπzE − cE − kE where zE = μE(1 − φ)+( 1− μE − μV )(1 − s)
uV = d + s(a − d)+pπzV − cV − kV where zV = μV (1 − φ)+( 1− μE − μV )s
We assume that the venture capitalist has all the bargaining power; we relax this
assumption in Section 3.4. The optimal contract maximizes uV by choice of d and s,
subject to uE ≥ 0, uV ≥ 0. To focus on non-trivial cases we assume that it is possible to
satisfy these two participation constraints. The timing of the game is as follows. At date
0, the entrepreneur and investor agree on a contract specifying the amount of debt and
equity (d and s). At date 1, the two parties exercise private eﬀort (e and v). At date 2,
4This does not mean that investors are restricted to use those speciﬁc securities. Indeed, as we will
discuss in the empirical analysis, venture capitalists often use convertible preferred equity. For simplicity’s
sake, the theoretical model does not try to distinguish between these alternative securities (see Hellmann
(2006) for a detailed analysis). Instead, the model focuses on the more general trade-oﬀ between upside
incentives and downside protection, which can be implemented either with a combination of debt and
equity or with convertible preferred securities.
To see this more formally, note that we can map convertible preferred equity into the model as follows. Let
h d denote the face (or preferred) value before conversion, and h s the percentage equity stake after conversion.




5For simplicity we assume that φ is a constant. Albeit tedious, it is possible to also allow the costs of
stealing to vary with the quality of the legal systems.
7cash ﬂows π occur in case of success. They are either stolen, or else divided according to
the contract. In addition, the asset value a is distributed according to the contract.
3.2 Optimal contracts
We solve the model backwards. Taking the stealing probabilities from date 2 as given,
the two parties choose their optimal eﬀort levels at date 1. We obtain the two incentive
constraints from the ﬁrst-order conditions of maximizing uV w.r.t. v,a n duE w.r.t. e:
e = pEπzE and v = pV πzV (1)
To see how equity aﬀects incentives, note that increasing s increases zV and thus v,
and it decreases zE and thus e. Interestingly, v and e are independent of d. This means
that debt only transfers utility between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. Put
diﬀerently, in this simple model, downside protection gives the venture capitalist additional
cash ﬂow rights without aﬀecting the balance of incentives. Hellmann (2006) shows that
even in a much more general setting, downside protection plays a similar role.
The optimal choices of d and s depend on whether the entrepreneur’s wealth constraint
is binding or not. Figure 1 shows the utility frontier for the entrepreneur and venture
capitalist. Its shape is standard for the double moral hazard model with wealth constraints.
If the entrepreneur receives a relatively high utility uE (which is necessary for high values of
kE), then the utility frontier consists of a −45◦ line. The entrepreneur’s wealth constraint
is not binding, and the two parties can implement a jointly optimal contract that we denote
by s∗ and d∗ (derived below). Along the −45◦ line, the venture capitalist can increase his
utility by increasing d.A td = a, however, the entrepreneur’s wealth constraint becomes
binding. To further increase the venture capitalist’s utility, the venture capitalist can only
increase s above s∗. This reduces the entrepreneur’s eﬀort level, which is ineﬃcient and
causes the utility frontier to slope at an angle less than −45◦ for lower levels of uE.F o r
very low levels of uE, the utility frontier may even bend backwards: the venture capitalist
holds excessive equity and the entrepreneur provides very little eﬀort, to the point that the
venture capitalist is worse oﬀ himself. In equilibrium the venture capitalist will never oﬀer
a contract on the backward bending part of the utility, but instead choose smax,w h i c h
corresponds to the peak of the utility frontier.
In the Appendix we solve out the remainder of the model and derive its comparative
statics. In the main text we only report the main results, and focus on discussing the
intuition behind them.
Proposition 1 (Investor support) The optimal level of value-added support v∗ is in-








Why would investors provide less support in a worse legal system? Stealing by the
entrepreneur creates two kinds of ineﬃciencies. First, stealing upsets the balance of in-
centives. For a given equity stake s, the more the entrepreneur can steal, the stronger
her incentives for value-creation, but the weaker the investor’s incentives. Second, any
stealing causes a loss of value, as measured by φ.T h eﬁrst ineﬃciency can be addressed
by adjusting the optimal division of equity. In particular, the Appendix shows that s is a
decreasing function of μE. This says that to correct for stealing by the entrepreneur, the
optimal contract increases the investor’s equity incentives. However, the key insight from
the model is that even with the optimal rebalancing of incentives, the support provided by
the investor remains lower when the entrepreneur steals more. The key intuition is that the
readjustment of equity stakes can only take care of the ﬁrst but not the second ineﬃciency.
That is, even the optimal contract cannot compensate for the fact that stealing creates
ineﬃcient loss of value. This reduces the total upside returns, and thus ex-ante incentives
for investor support.
This insight is also key in understanding the second part of Proposition 1. At ﬁrst, the
result that more stealing by the investor reduces his support might seem counter-intuitive.
After all, if the investor can steal more of the cash ﬂo w s ,s h o u l d n ’ th eh a v es t r o n g e r
incentives to generate them? The reason this intuition is wrong goes back to the two
ineﬃciencies of stealing. If the investor can steal more, this creates an incentive imbalance
where the investor has stronger (but the entrepreneur weaker) incentives. The optimal
contract rebalances this ineﬃciency by reducing the investor’s equity stake. However, the
optimal contract cannot remedy the second ineﬃciency, concerning the overall value loss
caused by ineﬃcient stealing. That is why we obtain the result that more stealing by the
investor also leads to less investor support.
Proposition 1 thus yields our ﬁrst testable implication, that there is a positive rela-
tionship between the quality of the respective legal systems, and the support provided by
venture capitalists. This eﬀect applies not only to the entrepreneur’s legal system (as prox-
ied by the entrepreneur’s probability of stealing), but also to the investor’s legal system
(as proxied by the investor’s probability of stealing).
We now turn to the second main result, concerning the optimal level of debt. If the en-
trepreneur faces a binding wealth constraint, then d = a, i.e., the level of debt is ﬁxed. The
interesting case thus pertains to the model without wealth constraints. In the Appendix
we derive a critical value of kE that we denote by kmax
E .
9Proposition 2 (Downside protection) Suppose kE <k max
E . The optimal level of debt







Proposition 2 yields our second testable implication, that in better legal systems the
optimal contract gives the venture capitalist additional downside protection. A priori, it is
not immediately clear how the quality of the legal system might aﬀect downside protection.
To get the intuition for Proposition 2 consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of a better legal system for
the entrepreneur (i.e., lower μE). The less the entrepreneur can steal, the more the optimal
contract allocates equity to the entrepreneur. There are also fewer eﬃciency losses from less
stealing. Even though the entrepreneur gets to steal less, her total utility on the upside is
higher in a better legal system. This implies that the investor can extract more rents from
the entrepreneur on the downside and still satisfy the entrepreneur’s overall reservation
utility. In essence, in a better legal system the investor is willing to give up more upside
equity in exchange for more downside protection.
Proposition 2 also shows that a similar reasoning applies for the investor’s legal system.
The less the investor steals, the higher the entrepreneur’s utility on the upside. This is
true even after accounting for the rebalancing of equity incentives. As a consequence the
investor can again ask for more downside protection, and still satisfy the entrepreneur’s
reservation utility.
Proposition 2 requires a mild technical condition, kE <k max
E , which is derived and
explained in the Appendix. The reason this condition is required is that the investor’s
total payoﬀ on the downside is a combination of debt and equity (i.e., d + s(a − d)). The
argument above explains why total downside protection is higher in a better legal system.
Note, however, that this can be achieved with higher d and/or higher s. The technical
condition kE <k max
E ensures that not only total downside protection (d + s(a − d)), but
also debt (d) is a decreasing function of the stealing probabilities. Moreover, the Appendix
shows that the upper bound on kE c a na l s ob er e - e x p r e s s e da sa nu p p e rb o u n do nt h e
asset value a.
3.3 Investor’s legal system
In our interpretation we associate the companies’ legal system with the probability of
stealing by the entrepreneur (μE) and the investor’s legal system with the probability of
stealing by the investor (μV ). While this is the most immediate interpretation, it simpliﬁes
a more complex reality. The ability of an investor to divert funds from the company may
also depend on the company’s legal system, and the ease with which an entrepreneur can
10appropriate cash ﬂows may also depend on the investor’s legal system. Put diﬀerently, in
addition to the primary eﬀect that one party’s legal system has on its own probability of
stealing, there may also be a secondary eﬀect on the other party’s probability of stealing.
In our model this turns out not to matter much, because Propositions 1 and 2 establish
that stealing by the entrepreneur and investor have symmetric eﬀects–they both decrease
investor support and downside protection. The primary and secondary eﬀects therefore all
point in the same direction.
So far we have treated the legal system as something that aﬀects the probabilities of
stealing. We now discuss the possibility that the legal system has a broader eﬀect on the
way that investors behave. In particular, we focus on the parameter pV , which measures
the value-adding competencies of venture capitalists. At the time of investment, these can
be taken as exogenous. However, venture capital ﬁrms can also make decisions about how
much they want to develop value-adding competencies. We can therefore think of pV as
being set at a prior date, before the venture capital ﬁrm engages in deals.
We then ask whether venture capitalists that operate predominantly in a better legal
environment also have stronger incentives to develop value-adding competencies. We as-
sume that each venture capital ﬁrm has an exogenously given home country and develops
competencies in line with its expected deal ﬂow. This can be characterized by a probability
distribution Ω over the types of entrepreneurs that it expects to invest in. Entrepreneurs
may diﬀer in terms of all model parameters. Let the vector x summarizes all these deal
characteristics, namely p0, pE, kE, kV , π and a.W ew r i t eΩ(μE,μ V ,x), noting that the
distribution of entrepreneurs depends both on x and the stealing parameters μE and μV .
We capture the notion of an investor’s home eﬀect as follows. We assume that investors
located in worse legal systems face a deal ﬂow containing higher values of μE and μV .
Formally, we equate a worse domestic legal system with a ﬁrst-order stochastic dominant
shift of the distribution of μE and/or μV , holding x constant.
In our model, the value-adding competencies of the venture capitalist are represented
by the support parameter pV . We assume that the cost of developing competencies is
given by a convex cost function CV (pV ). Each venture capitalist chooses pV to maximize
his utility, given by UV =
R
uV (μE,μ V ,x)dΩ(μE,μ V ,x) − CV (pV ).
Proposition 3 (Investor competence eﬀect)
(i) The better the entrepreneur’s or investor’s legal system, the more a venture capitalist
develops value-adding competencies. Formally, the optimal choice of pV is decreasing for
any ﬁrst order stochastic dominant shift of μE and μV .
(ii) For a given μE and μV , the level of venture capital support v∗ is increasing in pV .
11For kE <k max
E , the optimal amount of debt d∗ is also increasing in pV .
Proposition 3 consists of two parts. Part (i) shows that in better legal environments
venture capital ﬁrms have greater incentives to develop value-adding competencies. Intu-
itively, competencies are more valuable if the legal system is good. Formally, the proof
shows that the marginal beneﬁt of developing competencies is decreasing in μE and μV .
Part (ii) shows that, within a given legal system, venture capitalists with higher compe-
tencies provide more support. Under a mild technical condition (kE not too large) they
also ask for more downside protection. Proposition 3 implies that in a given country there
can be systematic diﬀerences between domestic and foreign investors. Speciﬁcally, if the
foreign investors come from a better legal system, they are likely to provide more sup-
port and ask for more downside protection (and vice versa). Proposition 3 captures one
important channel of how the investor’s legal system might inﬂuence investment practices.
Naturally there may be yet additional ways in which the investor’s legal system matters.
For instance, it may aﬀect the relationship between venture capitalists and their own
providers of funds. Venture capital ﬁrms typically receive their funds from a variety of
institutional investors such as pension funds. These ﬁnanciers are typically referred to
as limited partners. Axelson et al. (2007) provide a theory of how this relationship is
optimally structured. The legal system is likely to inﬂuence this relationship, especially in
terms of transparency and the governance that limited partners may exercise over venture
capitalists. While a formal model of this relationship is beyond the scope of this paper,
it is intuitively clear that a better legal system would better protect limited partners
from being expropriated by venture capitalists. Similar to Proposition 1, this implies more
eﬃcient contracting, so that venture capitalists retain more of the upside, and therefore
face better incentives. Limited partner eﬀects should thus further reinforce the predictions
from Propositions 1 and 2.
The relationship between venture capitalist and limited partners is typically based on
arm’s length legal contracts. In a weaker legal system contracting problems might result in
vertical integration as an alternative governance structure. Vertically integrated venture
capitalists are usually referred to as ‘captive’ ﬁrms, and are typically owned by banks or
corporations. Beyond investor behavior (as in Proposition 1 and 2) and competencies (as
in Proposition 3), the investor’s legal system might even inﬂuence the investor’s organiza-
tional structure. We will explore this further in the empirical analysis.
3.4 Further discussion
Our model assumes that venture capitalists have all the bargaining power. Relaxing this
does not aﬀect Propositions 1 and 3, but it may aﬀect Proposition 2. In the Appendix
12we consider the generalized Nash bargaining solution, where the venture capitalist’s bar-
gaining power β can take any value between zero and one. We show that there exists a
value b β (with 0 ≤ b β<1), such that Proposition 2 continues to hold for β>b β.F o rβ<b β,
however, the model predicts a negative relationship between the qualities of legal systems
and the optimal amount of debt.
The model uses a simple speciﬁcation of returns, where there are only two states: the
upside and the downside. It is easy to see that adding a third state, where the venture is a
complete failure with all assets being worthless, while maybe adding some realism, would
not change any of the results. More generally, Hellmann (2006) shows how the intuitive
results from a model with two states carry over to a much more general speciﬁcation of
returns.
We model the quality of the legal system in terms of the probability of stealing. An
alternative interpretation of the model is to think of (1 − μE − μV )π as the amount of
cash that is veriﬁable, and can thus be allocated between the entrepreneur and venture
capitalist. The entrepreneur is able to steal an amount μEπ, but incurs a cost of stealing
φμEπ. Similar for the investor. This speciﬁcation generates identical payoﬀs for the venture
capitalist and the entrepreneur, implying that the analysis remains valid. This alternative
interpretation has the attractive feature that it makes stealing a continuous as opposed
to bivariate variable. One technical limitation, however, is that it requires linearity of
contracts as an assumption.6
For simplicity we use a linear-quadratic speciﬁcation, where the eﬀorts of the entre-
preneur and investor are perfect substitutes (i.e., p = p0 + pEe + pV v). In reality the
interactions between those two parties are likely to be more complex. For instance, there
may be complementarities between the two eﬀorts. Formally, we can model this with a
Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation, where the probability of success is given by p = γeαvβ.D u e
to the complexity of our model, which includes double-sided moral hazard as well as steal-
ing of cash ﬂows by two parties, the model with α 6= β is not tractable. However, in the
Appendix we show that Propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold for the symmetric case of
α = β. We notice that Inderst and Müller (2004) also ﬁnd that the linear-quadratic and
Cobb-Douglas model yield analogous results in their model of venture ﬁnancing.
6In the bivariate interpretation there are only two outcomes, so that linear contracts are always optimal.
The interpretation with continuous stealing has an additional complication, in that the venture capitalist
could oﬀer an artiﬁcial non-linear contract that discourages stealing. Speciﬁcally, the contract would give
the entrepreneur her share allocation (1 − s) whenever proﬁts are exactly π, but nothing if proﬁts fall
short of π. This non-linear contract is largely an artifact of simplifying model assumptions, and bears
no resemblance to real world securities. In summary, the alternative interpretation of stealing continuous
amounts remains attractive as long as one is willing to impose linearity.
134T h e D a t a
In this Section we discuss the sources and nature of our data. We want to point out that
the European venture capital markets is a useful setting for testing our model. European
countries are broadly comparable in terms of their stages of economic development. The
European venture capital market has matured considerably throughout the 1990s, growing
in size and in its ability to invest in innovative companies with a potential for high-growth
(Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002, 2004), Da Rin et al. (2006)). It also has countries with diverse
legal origins and with diverse legal qualities.
4.1 Sources of data
Our data come from a variety of sources. Our primary source is a survey that we sent to
750 venture capital ﬁrms in the following seventeen countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. This set of countries includes all the
members of the European Union in the period under study, plus Norway and Switzerland.
We contacted venture ﬁrms that satisﬁed three conditions: (i) in 2001 they were full
members of the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) or of a national venture
capital organization, (ii) they were actively engaged in venture capital, and (iii) they were
still in operations in 2002.
We deliberately excluded private equity ﬁrms that only engage in non-venture private
equity deals such as mezzanine ﬁnance, management buy-outs (MBOs) or leveraged buy-
outs (LBOs).7 However, we did include private equity ﬁrms that invest in both venture
capital and non-venture private equity deals. For these, we considered only their venture
capital investments.
We collected our survey data between February 2002 and November 2003. We asked
venture capital ﬁrms about the investments they made between January 1998 and De-
cember 2001. The questions centered on key characteristics of the venture ﬁrm, on the
involvement with portfolio companies, and on some characteristics of these companies.
The survey asked respondents a substantial amount of detailed company-level informa-
tion. We also asked information on the educational background and work experience of
each venture partner.
We received 124 responses with various degrees of completeness. Of these, three ven-
ture ﬁrms had been formed in 2001 but had not yet made any investments, so we do not
7See Fenn et al. (1995) for a discussion of how the venture capital market is structured into two diﬀerent
segments, ’venture capital’ and ’non-venture private equity.’
14include them in our sample. We contacted all the venture ﬁrms that had sent us incom-
plete answers, and attempted to complete them whenever possible. As a further step, we
augmented the survey data with information from the websites of the respondents and
their portfolio companies. We also turned to commercially available databases: Amadeus,
Worldscope, and VenturExpert. We use information from these databases for two pur-
poses. First, they allow us to obtain missing information, such as the dates, stages, and
amounts of venture deals. Second, we use these databases to cross-check the information
obtained from respondents. Such cross-validation further enhances the reliability of our
data. Overall, we obtain data on 1,652 deals made by 119 venture ﬁrms. Unlike other pa-
pers, we refrain from using data from additional rounds that an investor makes in a given
company. That is, we restrict our data to the ﬁrst investment made by the investor in the
particular company. In the main body of the paper we focus the analysis on investments
within Europe (we discuss this further in Section 5.4). We thus drop investments in non-
European countries; as a result, our sample consists of a total of 1,428 deals. Moreover,
our sample includes 51 investors who invest abroad, in a total of 190 foreign deals.
Can we assess the quality of our sample relative to the underlying population? Other
papers in the literature avoid this question, because it is extremely diﬃcult to gather in-
formation on the population. Unlike banks, venture capital ﬁrms are not heavily regulated
and do not need to disclose information. To gather data on the population of 750 Euro-
pean venture capital ﬁrms, including those that did not respond to our survey, we used
two sources, the commercial database VenturExpert, and the statistics published by the
European Venture Capital Association (EVCA). We also made a substantial attempt to
collect additional data through direct phone calls, as well as through websites and other
trade publications. With considerable eﬀort, we were able to gather information on more
than two thirds of the population.
This additional data allows us to perform several checks on how well our sample repre-
sents the population of European venture capital ﬁrms. First, we look at how the sample
fares in spanning the underlying population. Table 1 compares the sample with the pop-
ulation it is drawn from. Panel A looks at the country composition. While there is some
variation in response rates across countries, our data represent a comprehensive cross-
section which provides a good coverage of all countries. No single country dominates the
response, and no country is left out. Most notably, our sample performs well in terms of
including ﬁrms from the larger venture capital markets: France, Germany, and the UK all
have response rates above 13%. The overall response rate of nearly 16% is larger than for
comparable surveys of industrial ﬁrms, as discussed by Graham and Harvey (2001).8
Panel B looks at the structure of both the sample and the population in terms of
8The typical response rate for such surveys is about 9%.
15organizational types. We partition the sample into independent, bank, corporate, and
public venture capital ﬁrms. Prior research has shown that alternative types of venture
ﬁrms may behave diﬀerently, and we want to ensure that our results are not driven by the
sample composition. Our sample closely reﬂects the distribution of types in the population.
Panel C compares the size distribution of our respondents with that of the population.
We consider two possible size measures: the number of partners, and the amount of capital
under management, both measured at the end of 2001. For the sample and the population
the mean and median values of partners virtually coincide. The amount under management
includes all funds managed by venture capital ﬁrms, including those invested in non-
venture private equity. The average ﬁrm size is larger for the population, due to the fact
that several large private equity ﬁrms, that invest mainly in non-venture private equity,
chose not to respond to our survey. Consistent with this, the median ﬁrm size is very
similar for the sample and the population.
Another notable strength of our data is it does not rely on a few venture capital ﬁrms.
Indeed, the single largest venture capital ﬁrm accounts for only 5% of the observations,
and the largest ﬁve venture capital ﬁrms for only 16% of the observations.
We also examine whether our respondents report only part of their portfolio, especially
if they tend to report their more successful deals. We address this concern in three ways.
First, in late 2003 we checked the websites of all respondents. When we exclude the 15
venture ﬁrms whose websites did not list portfolio companies, we ﬁnd that the portfolio
companies reported to us were over 90% those listed on the websites. Since two years
had elapsed from the closing of our sample, and new investments had naturally been
made, we conclude that our sample covers well over 90% of all deals, suggesting that it
is unlikely that our sample suﬀers from systematic under-reporting. Second, we compare
the exit rates for our sample with the oﬃcial statistics of the European Venture Capital
Association (EVCA), which classiﬁes IPOs, and mergers and acquisitions as exits. We made
an additional data collection eﬀort and obtained exit outcomes for all of our companies,
using the same classiﬁcation (see Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2008) for details). We
ﬁnd that 24.7% of companies in our sample had a successful exit rate over the period
1998-2005, By comparison, we obtain from EVCA all investments and exits over the same
period and ﬁnd an exit rate of 25.6%. It therefore appears that our sample is not biased
towards more (or less) successful companies. Third, we also consider the possibility that
there may be reporting biases in our data. Respondents might choose not to answer all
of our questions about their activities when their companies are not performing well. To
see whether our data present any such bias, we performed some additional tests. For all
of our dependent variables we correlate the exit rate with the response rate. We ﬁnd that
all the correlation coeﬃcients are all below 6%. We also estimate (unreported) Probit
16models to see whether the exit rate might explain reporting rates after controlling for
other observable characteristics. Naturally, we can only control for those characteristics
for which we have complete or near-complete reporting, namely investor characteristics
and company sectors. We ﬁn dt h a tt h ee x i tr a t ei ss t a t i s t i c a l l yh i g h l yi n s i g n i ﬁcant. These
results suggest that there is no reporting bias towards more successful companies.
4.2 Data Variables
Table 2 provides formal deﬁnitions for all variables used in the analysis. Table 3 reports
pairwise correlations between all variables. Table 4 Panel A contains descriptive statistics
for all the variables used in the analysis. The number of observations diﬀers across regres-
sions because of missing values for some of the variables. Table 4 Panel B shows the means
(or frequency) of our main dependent and independent variables across legal origins.
4.2.1 Motivating the dependent variables
In this paper we focus on how the legal system aﬀects the activities of venture capitalists
and their interaction with portfolio companies. Led by our theoretical model, we concen-
trate on two diﬀerent dimensions of the venture process: value-adding support and the
choice of securities.
The role of value-adding support (Proposition 1) has become a central theme in venture
capital research (Casamatta (2003), Hellmann (2000, 2002), Cestone (2004)). To capture
t h en o t i o no fs u p p o r t ,w eu s eI N T E R A C T I O N ,am e a s u r eo ft h ea m o u n to fi n t e r a c t i o n ,
looking at the reported frequency with which a venture capitalist is in contact with the
company. This is a useful summary measure of the amount of time and eﬀort that the
venture capitalist spends on the company; it is also a novel measure in the venture capital
literature.9
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) explain that while venture capitalists use a variety of
securities, many of these perform equivalent functions. Of central importance is how the
entire package of securities aﬀects the distribution of cash ﬂows rights, and especially
to what extent the venture capitalist gets his returns on the upside as compared to the
downside (Proposition 2). In an ideal scenario, we would be able to gather complete data on
the allocation of cash ﬂows rights, including all term sheets and valuations. However, since
such data is extremely sensitive, and since our aim was to gather a large and representative
9Note that while it is reasonable to consider the frequency of interactions largely a non-contractible
variable, it is not impossible that contracts (which are not observable to us) may still attempt to specify
some expectations about this. Even if speciﬁed in the contract, the enforceability of such clauses remains
uncertain.
17dataset, we deliberately limited our inquiry. We collected data on the types of securities
used, but not on the speciﬁc term sheets or valuations.
In our survey we asked about the entire set of securities used for each deal. This
question allowed for multiple responses. Since we consider this data of interest by itself,
Table 4, Panel B, tabulates, by legal system, the types of securities used in our dataset.
We see clear variation in the use of securities across legal systems.
To move beyond a mere description of the securities used, we leverage our theory.
Proposition 2 predicts that the optimal amount of debt, d∗, is decreasing in μE and μV .
This suggests that the better the legal system, the more the optimal contract places
emphasis on downside protection. Unfortunately, we do not have access to the details of
the legal contract, so that our data does not allow us to measure exact values of d∗.F o r
the empirical analysis we therefore rely on survey-based responses about the use of debt
and downside protection. This allows us to construct DOWNSIDE, a proxy variable for
the relative importance of downside protection. Using the data from Table 4, we refer to
straight debt, convertible debt and preferred equity as ‘downside securities,’ since they all
give the venture capitalist a larger stake on the downside, and build variables for the use
of each individual security in each ﬁnancing deal.10
4.2.2 Motivating the independent variables: legal origin and legal indices
Our ﬁrst group of independent variables concerns the legal system of companies and in-
vestors. We employ three alternative measures of the quality of the legal system. Legal
scholars classify national legal systems according to the legal origins of the commercial
code. La Porta et. al. (1998) propose two main categories: legal systems with common law
origin, and legal systems with civil law origin. The former category includes Anglo-Saxon
common law, while the latter includes French civil law, German civil law and Scandinavian
civil law. We construct two dummy variables (COMPANY—COMMON and INVESTOR—
COMMON) that classify our companies according to these two categories, using civil law
as the default category.
An alternative approach of classifying legal systems is to use more speciﬁc indices,
which measure certain aspects of the legal system. We use two standard indices: the
rule of law and the procedural complexity index. These two indices relate directly to our
concept of the ’quality’ of enforcement in a legal system. In our model the parameter μE
measures the probability with which an entrepreneur can steal from her company without
10In the instructions to the survey we speciﬁed functional deﬁnitions of these diﬀerent ﬁnancial instru-
ments in order to ensure consistency of responses. For example, our deﬁnition of convertible debt includes
convertible preferred debt, which is a security often used in venture deals (see Kaplan and Strömberg
(2003)).
18the investors detecting him. We look for empirical counterparts of this concept.
La Porta et. al. (1998) provide a detailed explanation of the rule of law index, which
measures the quality of legal enforcement. Their index is based on data for the early
1990s. Since enforcement evolves over time, we use a version of the rule of law index which
measures the quality of enforcement in the year 2000 and is published by the World Bank
(COMPANY—RULE, INVESTOR—RULE).
Our second index measure of the quality of the legal system, COMPANY—PROCEDURAL
(and INVESTOR—PROCEDURAL) is the index of procedural complexity, which measures
the degree of legal formalism, by averaging the cost, length of time and number of steps
necessary to perform two simple legal operations: recovering a bounced check and evicting
a tenant.
4.2.3 Motivating the independent variables: venture ﬁrm, company, and deal
variables
Our second set of independent variables captures investor-level and deal-level eﬀects. In-
dependent venture capital ﬁrms (INDEPENDENTVC) are conceived as specialized or-
ganizations, whose sole purpose is to maximize proﬁt. Captive venture capital ﬁrms are
investment vehicles that are used by established companies, banks, or the government, to
achieve both proﬁts as well as broader strategic goals (Gompers and Lerner (2000), Hell-
mann (2002), Hellmann et al. (2007)).11 Following our previous ﬁndings (Bottazzi et al.
(2007)), we also control for the size (VCSIZE) and age (VCAGE) of the venture investor.
Following KMS we then consider the importance of international experience in venture
investing (PARTNER—US—EXPERIENCE).
Our ﬁnal set of variables captures the eﬀects of deal-level characteristics. Syndication,
which is common in venture investing (Lerner (1994)) is likely to result in reduced in-
vestor activity because of free-riding. Partly as a response to this (Brander et al. (2002)),
syndicate members delegate the responsibility for interacting with the company to a syn-
dicate leader, who interacts with the company on their behalf. SYNDICATE—LEADER
and SYNDICATE—FOLLOWER capture these diﬀerent roles, which are diﬀerent for each
ﬁnancing deal.
Finally, we control for company age (COMPANY—AGE ) since companies with a
shorter track record (and experience) are more likely to need both monitoring and sup-
port from the venture investor. We also control for the stage (STAGE) of the company
11We carefully examined the three respondents which checked the ’other ’ category. One is a public
university fund, and was classiﬁed as public; another is a family-controlled fund, and was classiﬁed as
independent; the third is a fund owned by a government company which engages in ﬁnancing for small
businesses, and was classiﬁed as public.
19at the date of the deal, which provides an alternative measure of its maturity and need
for investor interaction. Since market conditions varied over the time period we study
we include year dummies to account for the date at which a company received funding.
Similarly, we control for industry.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Main legal system eﬀects
We are now in a position to empirically test our theoretical propositions. Our empirical
base regression is as follows:
Yic = Legal ∗ β1 + X0
iβi + X0
cβc + εic
where i indexes investors and c indexes companies. The dependent variables Yic measures
for investor i in company c the level of INTERACTION or DOWNSIDE. We use an or-
dered Probit model for INTERACTION, and a simple Probit model for DOWNSIDE. X0
i
is a vector of investor characteristics (INDEPENDENTVC, VCSIZE and VCAGE), and X0
c
is a vector of deal characteristics (SYNDICATE-LEADER, SYNDICATE-FOLLOWER,
COMPANY-AGE, STAGE, DEAL—YEAR and INDUSTRY). Since our data consists of
multiple investments made by diﬀerent venture capital ﬁrms, we cluster our standard er-
rors by venture capital ﬁrms. This allows for the error term εic to be correlated within
the deals made by a venture capital ﬁrm, and imposes a conservative standard for estab-
lishing statistical signiﬁcance. Clustering also implies the use of heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors. Finally, Legal is a legal systems measure (legal origin, rule of law index,
or procedural simplicity index) either from the company’s or the investor’s perspective.
Because the various legal indices are highly multi-collinear, the standard approach in the
literature is not to estimate legal systems eﬀects jointly. As a consequence we do not
include in the same regression more than one legal measure, nor do we jointly include
company and investor indices.
In Table 3, which shows the correlation matrix for the main dependent and independent
variables, we note that both INTERACTION and DOWNSIDE are positively correlated
with all of the legal system indices, at statistically signiﬁcant levels.
Univariate correlations are informative, but they obviously do not control for other
company and investor eﬀects. Our multivariate regression model controls for a broad set
of deal characteristics: syndication structure, company age, stage, industry and deal year.
In terms of investor characteristics, we control for the age and size of the venture capital
20ﬁrm.
Table 5 reports our empirical base model. Panel A examines the eﬀect of legal systems
on the INTERACTION variable, Panel B on the DOWNSIDE variable. We ﬁnd that the
legal system has a strong eﬀect on both of these outcome variables. All coeﬃcients are
positive and statistically signiﬁcant, most of them at the 1% level. The estimates also
appear to be economically large. For example, the probability of downside protection is
30% higher for a common law company than for a civil law company and the probability
of frequent interactions is 27% higher.12 For the rule of law index we ﬁnd, for example,
that relative to a French company, a UK company’s probability of downside protection
by 15% higher and the probability of frequent interactions is 28% higher. The procedural
index regressions produce similar magnitudes.
Whether a venture capital ﬁrm is independent or captive has a very strong eﬀect.
The coeﬃcient for independent venture capital is positive and statistically signiﬁcant both
for INTERACTION and DOWNSIDE. Obtaining ﬁnance from an independent venture
ﬁrm raises the probability of frequent interaction by 11% and of downside protection by
26%. This is an interesting result by itself, conﬁrming and extending some of the prior
ﬁndings on the distinction between independent and captive venture capital (Bottazzi et al.
(2007)). Interestingly, we ﬁnd that INTERACTION is larger for later stage companies. We
also ﬁnd that the age of venture capital ﬁr m si sn e g a t i v es i g n i ﬁcant for INTERACTION.
The prior literature sometimes interprets ﬁrm age as a proxy for quality or even investor
sophistication (see, for example, Sørensen (2007) and Gompers et al. (2005)), although
we caution against placing speciﬁc interpretations on age coeﬃcients, given that age can
stand for a wide variety of eﬀects. Finally, note also that the company age has a negative
relationship with downside protection.
5.2 Company versus investor legal system eﬀects
So far our analysis establishes the importance of the legal system, but does not yet ask
whether the company’s or the investor’s legal system matters more. In Section 3.3 we saw
why from a theoretical point of view, both may matter. We now examine the empirical
relevance of the respective legal systems.
We propose a new method of disentangling company and investor eﬀects that is based
on comparing two sets of ﬁxed eﬀect regressions. The ﬁrst set of regressions uses ﬁxed
eﬀects for the investor’s country. This provides a powerful way for controlling for all aspects
that relate to the investor’s country, including its legal system. Controlling for this, we
12To calculate the economic eﬀect for the interaction variable, which is a categorical variable, we create a
dummy variable that takes value 1 if interaction is ’frequent’ (i.e., monthly or weekly), and zero otherwise.
21examine whether the company’s legal system still retains its statistical signiﬁcance. If we
ﬁnd that it remains signiﬁc a n t ,t h e nw eh a v es t r o n ge v i d e n c et h a ti tm a t t e r s .I fi tb e c o m e s
insigniﬁcant, however, we can argue that the company’s legal system is actually irrelevant,
once investor country characteristics are fully accounted for.
This ﬁrst set of regressions probes into the eﬀects of the company’s legal system but
does not speak to the importance of the investor’s legal system. For this, we use a second
set of regressions, which simply reverses roles. That is, we use a complete set of company
country ﬁxed eﬀects and then examine whether the eﬀects of the investor’s legal system
retain any statistical signiﬁcance. This second set of regressions does not yield insights into
the importance of company’s legal systems, but provides us with a powerful test for the
importance of the investor’s legal system eﬀects. Combining the insights from these two
sets of regressions thus provides a comprehensive assessment of the relative importance of
the legal system of companies and investors.13
Table 6 shows the results of this approach. As before, Panel A reports regressions for
INTERACTION and Panel B for DOWNSIDE. The ﬁrst three columns report the results
for the model with investor country ﬁxed eﬀects. They inform us about the importance
of the company’s legal system. The last three columns report the results for the model
with company country ﬁxed eﬀects, showing the importance of the investor’s legal system.
The results are strikingly clear. After controlling for investor country ﬁxed eﬀects, the
estimates for the company’s legal system all become statistically insigniﬁcant. In contrast,
the estimates for the investor’s legal system retain their size and statistical signiﬁcance.
This pattern is true both for the INTERACTION and DOWNSIDE regressions.14
This is a new and important result. It shows that in order to fully understand the eﬀect
of legal systems, looking at the company’s legal system is not enough, and is possibly
misleading. Our results show the greater importance of investor rather than company
eﬀects of the legal system.
The remainder of this Section looks at a number of extensions. Because of the clear
message of Table 6, we omit any further discussion of companies’ legal systems variables
and focus on the investors’ legal systems.
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represents company’s legal system variables and Fi corresponds to a vector of investor country ﬁxed eﬀects.
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represents investor’s legal system variables and Fc corresponds to a vector of company country ﬁxed eﬀects.
14Instead of using ﬁxed eﬀects for the countries of the companies or investors, one might also think of
using ﬁxed eﬀect for the companies or investors directly. In our data we only observe a single investor for
almost all of our companies, which precludes the use of company ﬁxed eﬀects. However, we have multiple
company observations for almost all of our investors, so that we can use investor ﬁxed eﬀect. The results
from this approach are hardly surprising. Table 6 already shows that using investor country ﬁxed eﬀect
renders all the legal systems variables insigniﬁcant. Going to a ﬁner-grained speciﬁcation with individual
investor ﬁxed eﬀects does not alter this conclusion.
225.3 Limited partner eﬀects
The result that better legal systems are associated with more investor support and more
downside protection are consistent with Propositions 1 and 2. Probably the most surprising
ﬁnding is that the legal eﬀects are more important at the investor than company level.
Proposition 3 provides an explanation for this ﬁnding, showing how investor competencies
are determined by the home country environment. As noted in Section 3.3, there may be
additional channels through which investors’ legal systems matter, notably through the
relationship with limited partners. We gather additional data about the venture capital
ﬁrms’ limited partners. We ﬁnd that 71% of venture capital ﬁrms have only domestic
limited partners. It follows that limited partner and other investor legal system eﬀects are
likely to be intertwined, and disentangling limited partner eﬀects is an empirical challenge.
We suggest two empirical approaches.
Our ﬁrst approach looks for limited partners eﬀects by exploiting the presence of foreign
limited partners. It should be mentioned up-front that this approach has a conceptual
limitation, since a foreign limited partners may also be subject to the legal system of
the venture capital ﬁrm. Still, we consider the possibility that the legal system of foreign
limited partners may inﬂuence investment behavior. We construct limited partner legal
indices for each venture capital ﬁrm. Given that a venture capital ﬁrm often has more
than one limited partner, each index is computed as an average over all the ﬁrm’s limited
partners. In unreported regressions we ﬁnd that the additional information contained in
the limited partners’ legal measures does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on our dependent
variables.15
Our second approach focuses on the organizational structure of venture capital ﬁrms.
As noted before, some venture capital ﬁrms are independent partnerships that receive
their funding from limited partners in an arm’s length relationship. Others are so-called
captive venture capitalist ﬁrms, which are vertically integrated with their fund provider,
typically banks or corporations. In our theory section we argued that a better legal system
should prevent appropriation by limited partners, and therefore facilitate the formation
of independent venture capital ﬁrms. This would suggest a positive relationship between
the quality of the (investor) legal system and the presence of independent venture capital
ﬁrms. From Table 3 we see that there is a positive and signiﬁcant correlation between
the quality of the legal system and the presence of independent venture partnerships. In
addition to the direct eﬀect of investors’ legal systems, it thus appears that there are
15We consider two types of speciﬁcations. First, if we replace the baseline investor legal indices from
Table 6 with the equivalent limited partner indices we ﬁnd similar results, sometimes at lower levels of
signiﬁcance. Second, if we augment the investor level legal indices with limited partner level indices we
ﬁnd that the former retain their statistical signiﬁcance, whereas the latter are insigniﬁcant.
23indirect eﬀects that go through the organizational structure of the venture capital ﬁrms.
A better (investor) legal system promotes the formation of independent venture capital
ﬁrms. Tables 5 and 6 shows that independent venture capital ﬁrms provide more support
and require more downside protection. It follows that the indirect eﬀects further reinforce
the direct investor legal system eﬀect.
5.4 Investor experience
Our analysis emphasizes the importance of the investors’ legal system. As with any em-
pirical analysis, there is a concern about unobserved factors. In this section we examine
whether legal system eﬀects can be explained by other investor characteristics. Of partic-
ular relevance is the question of whether we have properly accounted for investor char-
acteristics relating to their experience with investing across diﬀerent countries. KMS, for
example, argue that investment styles are strongly inﬂuenced by whether investors have
previously invested in the US.
We therefore consider some additional investor characteristics. Because we have data on
individual partners, we may ask whether the professional experience of individual venture
partners matters. Speciﬁcally, our survey instrument asked whether the venture ﬁrm’s
partners had any experience working as a venture capitalist in the US. We thus construct
a variable which measures a ﬁrm’s fraction of partners with previous US venture capital
experience. Table 7 shows that all of the legal system coeﬃcients remain positive and
statistically signiﬁcant. The direct eﬀect of partner-level US experience is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant in both INTERACTION and DOWNSIDE regressions.
We also follow KMS and build two additional measure of familiarity with US investment
style. First, we measure whether a venture capital ﬁrm has made any US investments.
Second, we measure whether a venture ﬁrm has previously participated in a deal syndicated
with a US venture ﬁrm. In unreported regressions we ﬁnd that adding either of these
variable does not aﬀect the signiﬁcance of any of our legal system coeﬃcients. Moreover,
the two measures themselves turn out to be statistically insigniﬁcant.16
These results are consistent with the emphasis KMS give to the exposure to US expe-
rience as a determinant of investment styles. While KMS stress the learning which comes
from syndicating with US venture ﬁrms, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects for partners’ experience
as venture capitalists in the US.
16The same result is found when we build a dummy which measures whether a venture ﬁrms has either
invested in the US or syndicated with a US ﬁrm.
245.5 Within civil countries analysis
The literature on legal systems is often focused on the distinction between common and
civil law countries. This is clearly an important distinction, but it is interesting to note
than even within civil law countries, there might be considerable variation in the quality
of the legal system (Padilla and Requejo (2000), Spamann (2006)).
Our data allow us to extend our analysis and look at the diﬀerences within civil law
countries (see La Porta et. al. (1998)). To examine such diﬀerences, we consider only the
subsample of companies in civil law countries that receive ﬁnancing from civil law venture
capital ﬁrms. We use the rule of law and procedural complexity indices to measure the
quality of the investor’s legal system.
Table 8 reports the results of our regressions, which include investor legal system
eﬀects, with and without company country ﬁxed eﬀects. The measures of legal system
quality remain statistically signiﬁcant for the INTERACTION variable, suggesting that
for non-contractible actions, the legal system continues to matter even with the subset of
civil law countries.
In the DOWNSIDE regressions we ﬁnd that the legal system coeﬃcients remain posi-
tive, but are now statistically insigniﬁcant. Overall, while the level of signiﬁcance is not as
high, the pattern of how the legal system aﬀects the choice of securities remains similar.
5.6 Simple versus sophisticated securities
The analysis so far looks at a summary measure of downside protection. In Section 3 we
already noted that there exist alternative ways of implementing downside protection. One
way is to use simple debt. A more sophisticated method involves the use of convertible
securities. To retain its simplicity, our parsimonious theory does not try to distinguish be-
tween those two types, but the prior literature explains the advantages of such convertible
securities (see, in particular, Hellmann (2006) and Schmidt (2003)). Moreover, the empir-
ical work of LS and KMS focuses on the distinction between simple versus sophisticated
contractual features. A natural question in our context is thus whether legal systems have
ad i ﬀerential impact on the use of simple versus sophisticated securities.
Our data on securities is not as detailed as that of LS and KMS, but it still allows
us to distinguish between two types of downside protection: simple debt versus more
sophisticated securities such as convertible debt or preferred equity. Moreover, we can also
look at which securities are used on the upside, distinguishing between the use of straight
equity versus more sophisticated securities such as preferred equity or convertible debt.
For this part of the analysis we use the variables CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED, DEBT
and EQUITY, whose construction is described in Section 4.
25Using these variables, we separately estimate the base model of Table 5 and the com-
pany country ﬁxed eﬀect model of Table 6. The results are reported in Panels A, B, and
C of Table 9. The eﬀects of the investor’s legal system continue to be positive in all the
regressions for CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED (Panel A) and for DEBT (Panel B). The
signiﬁcance levels are somewhat lower, with some coeﬃcients being marginally insignif-
icant. Still, these results suggest that the legal system eﬀects continue to hold for both
types of downside protection.
The regression results in Panel A and B are quite similar, suggesting that simple and
sophisticated securities are close substitutes for implementing downside protection. To
further investigate this we estimate an additional regression model not reported here. We
re-run the regressions of Panel A of Table 9 comparing deals with convertible preferred
only against deals that also use debt. We ﬁnd that all legal variables are statistically in-
signiﬁcant. This is consistent with the notion that debt and convertible preferred securities
are substitutes for implementing downside protection.
Panel C extends the analysis to upside gains, looking at the use of simple equity. Here,
all the legal measures have a negative coeﬃcient for EQUITY, and four out of six co-
eﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that in better legal systems investors
switch from simple equity to more sophisticated convertible preferred securities. This ﬁnd-
ing is consistent with the results of KMS and LS.
Overall, the results of Table 9 conﬁrm our main result that a better legal system
makes increased use of downside protection. They also show that, to achieve this downside
protection, simple debt and more sophisticated convertible securities appear to be close
substitutes. On the upside, we ﬁnd that investors in better legal systems make greater use
of convertible securities rather than simple equity.
5.7 Further Discussion
In this paper we develop a simple theory for how legal systems aﬀect venture capital ac-
tivities. When we take the model to the data, we ﬁnd considerable empirical support. The
model thus provides a simple and intuitive explanation for the empirical ﬁndings. Natu-
rally, one may still wonder whether there are complementary or alternative explanations
for our empirical results. All our unreported regressions are available upon request.
One important question is whether the legal system matters because it forbids investors
to take certain actions (or write certain contracts), or because it inﬂuences, possibly in
more subtle and indirect ways, what investors prefer to do–along the lines of our model.
We can address this question in our context by asking whether certain investor actions,
such as providing value-adding support or asking for downside protection, are actually
26precluded by the legal system. The ﬁrst ﬁve rows of Panel B of Table 4 tabulate our
dependent variables across the four legal systems. While there are clear diﬀerences in the
relative frequency of these activities, there are no cells with 0% or 100%. This shows that
none of the legal systems preclude venture capitalists from doing these activities, a result
also corroborated by LS. We can therefore reject one alternative interpretation of our
results, that the legal systems matters because it simply doesn’t allow investors to take
certain actions.
As with any empirical analysis, there is always a question about whether we have
controlled for enough other eﬀects. With hand-collected data, there is an additional trade-
oﬀ that adding variables comes at a cost of loosing observations. Our base speciﬁcation
focuses on a few important investor and company characteristics. We did several additional
checks to see whether other variables aﬀect our results.
Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) note that the size of an investor’s stake aﬀects his
incentive to be involved with the company. We do not have data on equity stakes, but
we have some data on the amount of money invested. Unfortunately this data is highly
incomplete so that including the amount-of-money variable means using fewer than half
of our sample companies. In unreported regressions we ﬁnd that the amount-of-money
variable has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on INTERACTION, suggesting that investors
with larger stakes provide more support.
Venture capitalists rely on stock markets to exit their investments. One may therefore
ask whether investment behavior also depends on the liquidity of their domestic stock
markets. We consider the market capitalization of the investors’ and companies’ domestic
stock markets, which we normalize by GDP. Moreover, to account for the state of the IPO
market, we also consider the number of domestic IPOs, normalized by the total number
of listed companies at the end of the previous year. In unreported regression we ﬁnd that
these stock market liquidity variables are almost always insigniﬁcant, and that the legal
systems variables almost always retain their statistical signiﬁcance. Details are available
upon request.
Our base model already includes calendar year controls, but one may also be concerned
about industry-speciﬁc shocks. For instance, our sample period includes the “dotcom” pe-
riod. We therefore performed some additional robustness checks. It might be argued that
the dotcom period involved software deals that do not ﬁt the traditional notion of a high-
tech deal. When we drop all deals in the Internet and software industry we lose 30%
of the observations but our results are virtually unchanged. More generally, we consider
the possibility that there might be country and industry speciﬁcc y c l e st h a ta ﬀect invest-
ment behaviors. We therefore compiled data from the yearbooks of the European Venture
Capital Association (EVCA) and the Israeli Venture Capital Association. The data re-
27ports aggregate investment amounts by country and industry, although it unfortunately
aggregates venture capital and buyout investments, and it also aggregates across some of
the smaller industry categories. To examine the importance of industry cycles we thus
consider the country-industry-speciﬁc growth rate in the amount invested. We ﬁnd that
adding this control to our regressions does not alter any of our main conclusions. The
industry cycle variable itself is always insigniﬁcant, and the signiﬁcance of the legal index
variables remains unaﬀected. We also consider the possibility of stage-speciﬁc cycles, i.e.,
t h ef a c tt h a tt h e r em a yb ed i ﬀerent cyclical variation for early versus late-stage ﬁnancing.
EVCA reports data by country and stage. This data does not aggregate venture capital
and buyouts, but it does aggregate over all industries. When we control for stage cycles,
we ﬁnd again that adding this control does not aﬀect any of our main results.17
We also did some robustness checks on our dependent variables. In the construction
of our downside measure we used the information on the entire set of securities used to
ﬁnance a deal. In our survey we also asked which security was the most important in
the deal, i.e., we asked what the main security used was. We make use of this additional
information and modify our downside measure to include only the main security used.
When we use this alternative measure we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant changes in our results.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we develop a theory of how the legal system aﬀects investor involvement
and downside protection. Testing the theory on a hand-collected dataset of European
venture capital deals, we conﬁrm the model predictions. The evidence shows how the
legal system aﬀects not only the contractual, but also the non-contractual aspects of the
ﬁnancing relationship. These results show that the law and ﬁnance literature can gain new
insights by adopting a wider perspective. Most of the existing empirical studies focus on
understanding how the law determines contractual choices. We hope that our examination
of non-contractual aspects provides a stimulus for further work on how legal systems aﬀect
ﬁnancial intermediation more broadly.
A central ﬁnding of this paper is that the investors’ legal systems seem to matter more
than companies’ legal systems. This is consistent with KMS, who argue that investors can
contract around some of the weaknesses of the companies’ legal system. An additional
insight here is that not all investors are equally likely to do so. In particular, our analysis
shows that investors contract around these weaknesses more often when they themselves
come from a stronger legal system.
17Note also that throughout the analysis we treat STAGE as an ordered variable. Alternatively using a
set of dummies for each distinct stage does not aﬀect any of our results.
28Our evidence on the importance of legal systems for the structure of venture capital
relationships also has important policy implications. The US has been widely viewed as the
leading example of a modern venture capital industry. Yet, as policy makers from around
the world have strived to emulate the US model, they encountered numerous problems.
The prior work of KMS already establishes the importance of US style contracting for
venture capital investing. Our results conﬁrm and further extend this line of reasoning.
In particular, the adoption of certain contracting practices, such as downside protection,
is aﬀected by the investor’s home legal system. Investors in common law countries, for
example, are more likely to use such contracts, not only at home but also when investing
abroad. Moreover, the adoption of these contracting practices goes hand-in-hand with a
broader involvement of investors in their companies. The quality of the investor’s home
country legal system thus plays a critical role in the development of a well-functioning
venture capital market. The resulting policy implication is that adoption of a US-style
venture capital model should become more eﬀective when accompanied by a broader eﬀort
to improve the quality of the investor’s legal system.
29Appendix
Throughout the Appendix, a bar over a variable signiﬁes one minus that variable: e.g.,
φ =1 −φ. Whenever convenient, we refer to the entrepreneur as E and the venture investor
as V .I ti su s e f u lt od e ﬁne the following two variables
b μ =1− μE − μV and e μ =1− μEφ − μV φ
The ex-ante utilities are given by
uE =( a − d)s + wE − kE and uV = d +( a − d)s + wV − kV
where
wE = pπzE −
e2
2




zE = μEφ + b μs and zV = μV φ + b μs.
We solve the model by backward induction, starting with E’s and V ’s optimal choices
of eﬀort. Maximizing wE w.r.t. e and wV w.r.t. v yields
e = pEπzE and v = pV πzV .( 2 )
The following variables will be useful for the remainder of the model. Let
P0 = p0π, PE = p2
Eπ2 and PV = p2
V π2.
Using the expressions for the optimal actions, we obtain
pπ = p0π + pEeπ + pV vπ = P0 + PEzE + PV zV .
Using this in the above expressions for wE and wV we obtain








V + PEzV zE
For future reference, it us useful to deﬁne the range of values for s where the utility
30frontier is downwardsloping. We note that
duE
ds
< 0 provided s>s min,w h e r ew eo b t a i n
the minimal level of equity smin from
duE
ds
=0 . Straightforward calculations reveal that
smin = Max[0,
−P0 − PEb μ + PV b μ − PEμEφ − PV μV φ + PV μEφ









=0 . Straightforward calculations reveal that
smax = Min[1,
P0 + PEb μ + PV μV φ + PEμEφ − PEμV φ
(2PE − PV )b μ
] (3)
We ﬁrst consider the model where the wealth constraint is not binding, i.e., where the
optimal contact can be implemented with some d<a .I fV has all the bargaining power,
we have uE =0so that




We can use this in uV to obtain after simple transformations
uV = wE + wV + a − kE − kV
The optimal choice of equity maximizes uV , which is equivalent to maximizing wE + wV .
The ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal choice of s simpliﬁes to PV zE −PEzV =0 ,w h i c h










This expression has many intuitive properties. The ﬁrst term is standard in the double
moral hazard literature, and shows that V ’s stake in related to his productivity (as mea-
sured by PV ), relative to that of E (PE). The second term provides an adjustment of V ’s
optimal equity stake that takes into account the relative stealing probabilities. Intuitively,
the more E steals, the more V needs to increase his stake, but the more V steals, the
more his stake can be reduced. Formally, we obtain the following comparative statics for


























< 0 ⇔ μE <
PE
PE + PV
.A sl o n ga st h e
stealing probabilities are not too large, we obtain the above mentioned intuitive result.
However, there will be no need to restrict the analysis to such lower stealing probabilities.



































































































= −pV πPV φ<0.
Note that weaker legal systems reduce not only V ’s but also E’s equilibrium level of eﬀort.




























































This condition requires that kE be not too large. Note also that from kE = wE −s(d−a),
the highest relevant value of kE is attained at d =0 , i.e., at kd=0
E = wE+sa. The condition
kE <k max













Thus, for all a ≤ ad=0
(1) , Proposition 2 holds for all relevant values of kE.






> 0 then we obtain
dd
dμV






< 0, then straightforward calculations reveal that the results that
dd
dμE
< 0 requires the following condition on kE:
kE <k max
























33We now turn to the model where the wealth constraint is binding, so that d = a.I n




= −b μ[P0 + PEzE + PV zV − PV zE]
w h e r ew en o t et h a t
∂wE
∂s
> 0 whenever s>s min, which is always true in the constrained
model.
As a next step, we consider the partial derivative of uE w.r.t. μE and μV . Straightfor-
ward calculations reveal that
∂wE
∂μE
=( P0 + PEzE + PV zV − PV zE)s − (P0 + PEzE + PV zV )φ
∂wE
∂μV
= −(P0 + PEzE + PV zV − PV zE)s − PV zEφ
































P0 + PEzE + PV zV − PV zE
For Proposition 1 we note that
dzV
dμE






= φ − s + b μ
∂s
∂μV
.U s i n g








P0 + PEzE + PV zV − PV zE
< 0












< 0, which proves
that Proposition 1 continues to hold in the constrained model.
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P0 + PV φ − PEφ +( 2 PE − PV )μEφ
(2PE − PV )b μ2






















< 0,s ot h a tP r o p o s i t i o n1
continues to hold. Proposition 2 obviously does not apply to the constrained model where
d = a.
We now turn to Proposition 3. We only provide the proof for the unconstrained model.
V maximizes UV =
R
wV (μE,μ V ,x)dΩ(μE,μ V ,x)−CV (pV ), so that the ﬁrst-order condi-




V (pV ). The left-hand side expression is decreasing













from (8) and then take






< 0. Tedious but












V PE − 2PV P2
E
(PV + PE)3 < 0















(PV + PE)2 > 0. This shows that
V ’s support is increasing in pV .































35Straightforward calculations reveal that the condition
dd∗
dPV
> 0 is satisﬁed whenever
kE <k max
E(3) ≡ wE + sb μ(
(2PV + PE)PEe μ
PV + PE
− P0)
This condition can only be binding for
a>a d=0
(3) ≡ b μ(
(2PV + PE)PEe μ
PV + PE
− P0).
Note that in the main text we simplify the exposition by stating a suﬃcient condi-
tion which only uses a single upper bound on kmax









To see the importance of bargaining power, suppose instead that d∗ is determined
by the generalized Nash bargaining solution, where β measures the venture capitalist’s




E , which yields after standard
transformations the following ﬁrst order condition: βuE − (1 − β)uV =0⇔
β(wE − kE) − (1 − β)(wV − kV )+( β − s)a − ds =0






























Using equations (6) and (8) we obtain after transformations
dd
dμE




















V PE ++ 2 PV P2
E
(PV + PE)2
Note that for some parameter constellations is it possible that b βE < 0 in which case the
























V PE +2 PV P2
E
(PV + PE)2
Overall we conclude that Proposition 2 continues to be valid whenever β>M a x [b βE,b βV ].
Finally, we consider a speciﬁcation, where the eﬀorts of the entrepreneur and investor
are complementary. We use linear eﬀort costs e and v, and a Cobb-Douglas like probability
of success p = γeαvβ. For a well-behaved solution we require α+β<1, implying decreasing
returns to eﬀort. It turns out that in our model the parameter γ always gets multiplied
with π, so that w.l.o.g. we can set γ =1 . Unfortunately the model with α 6= β is not
tractable. We therefore limit the analysis to the special case where α = β.I nt h i sm o d e l
we have
wE = pπzE − e = eαvβπzE − e and wV = pπzV − v = eαvβπzV − v
The optimal eﬀort choices are given by the following ﬁrst-order conditions.
αeα−1vαπzE =1and βeαvα−1πzV =1


































































For the optimal contract consider ﬁrst the model without wealth constraints. The
optimal contract maximizes wE + wV . Thanks to the symmetric structure of the model,









37With this, we obtain zE = zV =
h μ
2 which also implies


































































< 0 ⇔ μE <
1
2
, which we assume for simplicity.
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For the model with a wealth constraint, we maximize wV s.t. wE = kE. To show that













. We obtain this from totally diﬀerentiating wE = kE. After






(s − φ)(1 − α)zV − sαzE







αzE(φ − s) − (1 − α)zV s






















(1 − α)zV − αzE
< 0
Finally, we consider the model where s = smax. Standard calculations reveal that
smax =( 1− α)+
(1 − α)μEφ − αμV φ
b μ






= −φ(1 − α) < 0
which again conﬁrms Proposition 1.
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43Table 1: Sample properties
This table compares our sample to the population it is drawn from. Panel A looks at the country composition
and response rates, Panel B at the composition by venture ﬁrm type, and Panel C at the size composition.
Variables are deﬁned in Section 3. Partners are measured in units, the amount managed in million of current
euros.
Panel A: COUNTRY COMPOSITION AND RESPONSE RATE
POPULATION SAMPLE RESPONSE RATE
Austria 23 8 34.8%
Belgium 34 4 11.8%
Denmark 29 4 13.8%
Finland 33 6 18.2%
France 101 14 13.9%
Germany 146 19 13.0%
Greece 8 4 50.0%
Ireland 15 3 20.0%
Italy 37 5 13.5%
Luxembourg 3 1 33.3%
The Netherlands 52 4 7.7%
Norway 22 2 9.1%
Portugal 10 2 20.0%
Spain 38 10 26.3%
Sweden 17 6 35.3%
Switzerland 43 6 14.0%
UK 139 21 15.1%
TOTAL 750 119 15.8%






Panel C: COMPOSITION BY SIZE
POPULATION
Mean Median Min. Max.
Number of partners 4.3 3 1 25
Amount managed 333.4 60 1 14,200
SAMPLE
Mean Median Min. Max.
Number of partners 4.2 3 1 20
Amount managed 182.8 50 2 4,500T a b l e2 :V a r i a b l ed e ﬁnitions
Table 2(a): Dependent variables
These variables are measured at the portfolio company level.
Variable Description
INTERACTION is an ordered variable that takes values 1 to 4 if the venture capital ﬁrm
is reported to interact with the company on a weekly, monthly, quarterly,
or annual basis, respectively. We obtain the data from our survey instru-
ment, which asked: H o wm a n yt i m e sp e ry e a rd o e s( d i d )t h er e s p o n s i b l e
partner(s)/manager(s) personally interact with this company? (check
one). Possible answers were: annually; quarterly; monthly; weekly.
DOWNSIDE dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the instruments used for ﬁnanc-
ing the company includes one of the following: straight debt, convertible
debt or preferred equity; 0 otherwise. We obtain the data from our
survey instrument, which asked: Which of the following ﬁnancial instru-
ments has your ﬁrm used to ﬁnance this company? Possible answers
were: common equity; straight debt; convertible debt; preferred equity;
warrants.
CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the deal includes convertible
debt or preferred equity, and 0 otherwise.
DEBT dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the deal includes straight debt,
and 0 otherwise.
EQUITY dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the deal includes common
equity, and 0 otherwise.Table 2(b): Independent variables: Legal origin and legal indices
These variables are measured at the portfolio company or investor level.
Variable Description
COMPANY—COMMON dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located
in a legal system of common law (from LaPorta et al. (1998)),
and 0 otherwise.
COMPANY—RULE measure of the quality of enforcement of legal rules in the country
of the company based on an on an index ranging from —2.5 to 2.5
developed by the World Bank and described in Kaufman et al.
(2002).
COMPANY—PROCEDURAL measure of the degree of legal formalism of the legal system of the
portfolio company based on an index ranging from 0 to 100, from
the World Bank Doing Business database for the year 2000. This
index is discussed in Djankov et al. (2002) and is published by
the World Bank’s ’Doing Business’ project. In order to make our
results easier to interpret, this measure is rescaled by subtracting
the original value from 100, so that a higher value corresponds to
a less formal (i.e., better) legal system.
INVESTOR—COMMON dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the investor’s main oﬃce
is located in a legal system of common law (from LaPorta et al.
(1998)), and 0 otherwise.
INVESTOR—RULE measure of the quality of enforcement of legal rules in the country
of the investor based on an on an index ranging from —2.5 to 2.5
developed by the World Bank and described in Kaufman et al.
(2002).
INVESTOR—PROCEDURAL measure of the degree of legal formalism of the legal system of
the investor based on an index ranging from 0 to 100, from the
World Bank Doing Business database for the year 2000. This
index is discussed in Djankov et al. (2002) and is published by
the World Bank’s ’Doing Business’ project. In order to make our
results easier to interpret, this measure is rescaled by subtracting
the original value from 100, so that a higher value corresponds to
a less formal (i.e., better) legal system.Table 2(c): Independent variables: venture ﬁrm variables
These variables are measured at the investor level.
Variable Description
INDEPENDENT-VC dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capitalist
deﬁnes itself as an independent venture ﬁrm; 0 otherwise.
VC—SIZE amount of capital under management of the venture capital ﬁrm
at the end of the sample period (2001), in millions of current eu-
ros. We obtain the data by directly contacting respondent com-
panies after receiving their main answers. For those ﬁrms for
which we had not received the information directly we gathered
the data from commercial databases, company websites and in-
dustry sources.
VC—AGE age of the venture capital ﬁrm, measured in months at the end
of the sample period. We obtain the data from our survey in-
strument, which asked: Indicate the date of creation of your ﬁrm
(mm/yy). For those ﬁrms for which we had not received the infor-
mation directly we gathered the data from commercial databases,
company websites and industry sources.
PARTNER—US—EXPERIENCE the fraction of the venture ﬁrm’s partners who have prior experi-
ence as venture partners in the US.Table 2(d): Independent variables: company and deal variables
These variables are measured at the company and deal level.
Variable Description
SYNDICATE—LEADER dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is ﬁnanced
with a syndicated deal and the venture capital ﬁrm is the leader
of the syndicate; 0 otherwise. We obtain the data from our survey
instrument, which asked: If the deal was syndicated, was your ﬁrm
the lead investor? Possible answers were: Yes; No.
SYNDICATE—FOLLOWER dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is ﬁnanced
with a syndicated deal and the venture capital ﬁrm is not the
leader of the syndicate; 0 otherwise. We obtain the data from our
survey instrument, which asked: If the deal was syndicated, was
your ﬁrm the lead investor? Possible answers were: Yes; No.
COMPANY—AGE age of the company, measured in months at the time of the deal.
We obtain the data from our survey instrument , which asked
(for each company): Indicate the date of creation of the company
(mm/yy), Indicate the date of your ﬁrst round of ﬁnancing to this
company (mm/yy).
STAGE ordered variable that takes the values 1 to 4 if a deal is reported
as seed, start-up, expansion or bridge. We obtain the data from
our survey instrument, which asked: Indicate the type of your ﬁrst
round of ﬁnancing to this company (check one). Possible answers
were: Seed; Start-up; Expansion; and Bridge.
DEAL—YEAR set of four dummy variables each of which takes the value 1 if
a deal took place in 1998, 1999, 2000, or 2001 (respectively); 0
otherwise. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which
asked: Indicate the date of your ﬁrst round of ﬁnancing to this
company (mm/yy).
INDUSTRY set of a dummy variables that take the value 1 if the company is re-
ported to operate in one the following industries; 0 otherwise. We
obtain the data from our survey instrument, which gave the fol-
lowing options: Biotech and pharma; Medical products; Software
and internet; Financial services; Industrial services; Electronics;
Consumer services; Telecom; Food and consumer goods; Industrial
products (incl. energy); Media & Entertainment; Other.Table 3: Pairwise correlations
Correlations signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identiﬁed by ***, **, *.
INTER- DOWN- COMP. COMP. COMP. INVES. INVEST. INVEST . INDEP. VC VC
ACTION SIDE COMMON RULE PROCED. COMMON RULE PROCED. VC SIZE AGE
INTERACTION 1.000
DOWNSIDE 0.106*** 1.000
COMPANY—COMMON 0.145*** 0.264*** 1.000
COMPANY—RUE 0.301*** 0.197*** 0.337*** 1.000
COMPANY—PROCED. 0.335*** 0.224*** 0.587*** 0.758*** 1.000
INVESTOR—COMMON 0.195*** 0.287*** 0.813*** 0.305*** 0.499*** 1.000
INVESTOR—RULE 0.378*** 0.209*** 0.293*** 0.884*** 0.677*** 0.358*** 1.000
INVESTOR—PROCED. 0.450*** 0.248*** 0.492*** 0.670*** 0.884*** 0.599*** 0.755*** 1.000
INDEPEND.—VC 0.295*** 0.208*** 0.167*** 0.187*** 0.212*** 0.163*** 0.202*** 0.323*** 1.000
VC—SIZE —0.117*** —0.022 —0.083*** —0.052** —0.114*** —0.089*** —0.034 —0.116*** —0.113*** 1.000
VC—AGE 0.374*** 0.174*** 0.039 —0.013 —0.044 —0.034 —0.088*** —0.166*** —0.095*** 0.098*** 1.000
NO—SYNDICATE 0.011 —0.066** 0.043 0.051* 0.039 0.024 —0.009 —0.010 0.124*** —0.025 0.051*
SYND—LEAD. 0.106*** 0.012 —0.025 —0.045 —0.074** 0.035 0.012 —0.019 —0.041 0.015 —0.163***
SYND—FOLL. —0.097*** 0.058** —0.022 —0.008 0.026 —0.055 0.002 0.018 —0.156*** 0.011 0.093***
COMPANY—AGE —0.117*** —0.057* —0.056* —0.107*** —0.052* —0.039 —0.089*** —0.036 —0.068** —0.029 0.074**
STAGE 0.025 —0.037 0.062** —0.042 0.039 0.101*** —0.011 0.064** —0.098*** 0.091*** 0.059**
DEAL—1998 0.055* 0.002 0.034 0.046* 0.042 0.007 0.023 0.018 —0.038 —0.025 0.118***
DEAL—1999 —0.080*** 0.003 —0.057** —0.066** —0.079*** —0.059** —0.073*** —0.079*** —0.019 0.043 0.053*
DEAL—2000 0.074** —0.009 0.010 0.003*** 0.003 0.041 0.023 0.029 0.073*** —0.002 —0.118***
DEAL—2001 0.028 0.006 0.015 0.023 0.036 0.004 0.025 0.028 —0.033 —0.019 0.009Table 3 (continued): Pairwise correlations
NO SYND. SYND. COMP. STAGE DEAL DEAL DEAL DEAL
SYND. LEAD. FOLL. AGE 1998 1999 2000 2001
NO—SYNDICATE 1.000
SYND—LEAD. —0.428*** 1.000
SYND—FOLL. —0.636*** —0.427*** 1.000
COMPANY—AGE —0.051* —0.055* —0.008 1.000
STAGE 0.040 —0.086*** 0.035 0.039*** 1.000
DEAL—1998 0.070** 0.076** —0.006 0.034 —0.035 1.000
DEAL—1999 0.018 0.001 0.019 0.034 0.059** —0.195*** 1.000
DEAL—2000 0.024 0.020 —0.042 —0.051* —0.068** —0.289*** —0.400*** 1.000
DEAL—2001 0.093*** 0.034 0.067* —0.001 0.045 —0.241*** —0.333*** —0.495*** 1.000Table 4: Descriptive statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics for all our dependent and independent variables. Panel A provides
descriptive statistics. For dummy variables the MEAN column reports the frequency of observations. Panel B
provides mean values (frequencies for dummy variables) by legal system of the company. Since we count all the
securities used in a deal, their frequencies may sum to more than 1. Variables are deﬁned in Section 4.
Panel A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
VARIABLE MEAN MEDIAN MIN MAX OBS
Interaction 2.972 3 1 4 1,252
Downside 0.451 — 0 1 1,392
Convertible Preferred 0.375 — 0 1 1,392
Debt 0.097 — 0 1 1,392
Equity 0.745 — 0 1 1,387
Company—Common 0.160 — 0 1 1,429
Company—Rule 1.759 1.900 0.660 2.360 1,429
Company—Procedural 41.356 39.000 17.000 64.000 1,423
Investor—Common 0.160 — 0 1 1,429
Investor—Rule 1.747 1.900 0.660 2,360 1,429
Investor—Procedural 40.931 39.000 17.000 64.000 1,422
IndependentVC 0.580 — 0 1 1,429
VC—Size 244 85 1 4,500 1,417
VC—Age 94 54 12 390 1,429
Partner—US—Experience 0.045 — 0 1 1,381
No—Syndicate 0.390 — 0 1 1,134
Syndicate—Leader 0.225 — 0 1 1,134
Syndicate—Follower 0.385 — 0 1 1,134
Company—Age 56.509 24 0 41,179 1,181
Stage 2.253 2 1 4 1,303
Deal—1998 0.220 - 0 1 1,297
Deal—1999 0.212 - 0 1 1,297
Deal—2000 0.373 - 0 1 1,297
Deal—2001 0.291 - 0 1 1,297
Biotech and pharma 0.139 - 0 1 1,417
Medical products 0.067 - 0 1 1,417
Software and Internet 0.303 - 0 1 1,417
Financial services 0.037 - 0 1 1,417
Industrial services 0.039 - 0 1 1,417
Electronics 0.058 - 0 1 1,417
Telecom 0.072 - 0 1 1,417
Consumer services 0.123 - 0 1 1,417
Food and consumer goods 0.023 - 0 1 1,417
Industrial products 0.014 - 0 1 1,417
Media & entertainment 0.065 - 0 1 1,417
Other industries 0.059 - 0 1 1,417P a n e lB :M E A NV A L U E S ,B YL E G A LS Y S T E M
Common Civil
VARIABLE Anglo-Saxon French German Scandinavian Obs
Interaction 3.229 2.658 3.155 3.204 1,252
Downside 0.748 0.358 0.337 0.546 1,392
Convertible Preferred 0.550 0.314 0.264 0.506 1,392
Debt 0.251 0.053 0.091 0.068 1,392
Equity 0.541 0.754 0.876 0.738 1,387
Company—Common 1 — — — 1,429
Company—Rule 2.024 1.415 1.984 2.024 1,429
Company—Procedural 63.345 26.639 42.030 55.139 1,423
Investor—Common 0.842 0.028 0.028 0.036 1,429
Investor—Rule 1.979 1.432 1.942 2.014 1,429
investor—Procedural 59.489 27.715 41.267 54.836 1,422
IndependentVC 0.768 0.248 0.673 0.581 1,429
VC-Size 127 345 199 177 1,417
VC-Age 102 106 77 82 1,429
No—Syndicate 0.440 0.387 0.395 0.341 1,134
Syndicate—Leader 0.203 0.250 0.220 0.191 1,134
Syndicate—Follower 0.357 0.363 0.385 0.468 1,134
Partner—US—Experience 0.052 0.036 0.058 0.046 1,382
Company—Age 44.057 71.222 48.861 44.537 1,181
Stage 2.366 2.288 2.173 2.180 1,303T a b l e5 :B a s em o d e l
This Table reports results from (ordered) Probit regressions for our base model described in Section 5.1. The dependent
variables are INTERACTION in Panel A and DOWNSIDE in Panel B. For each Panel, columns (i) through (vi) report
estimates for models whose main independent variable is a diﬀerent measure of company, or investor, legal system. All
models also include investor and deal controls. Investor controls are INDEPENDENTVC, VC—AGE, and VC—SIZE.
Deal Controls are COMPANY—AGE, STAGE, SYNDICATE—FOLLOWER, and SYNDICATE—LEADER (reported),
and DEAL—YEAR and INDUSTRY dummies (unreported). Variables are deﬁned in Section 4. For each independent
variable, we report the estimated coeﬃcient and the t-ratio (in parenthesis), computed using heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors, clustered by venture ﬁrm. Values signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identiﬁed by ***, **, *.
Panel A: INTERACTION













IndependentVC 0.537** 0.479** 0.444** 0.526** 0.444** 0.381*
(0.22) (0.21) (0.20) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20)
VC—Age -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
VC—Size -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Syndicate—Follower -0.070 -0.018 -0.051 -0.067 -0.040 -0.077
(0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20)
Syndicate—Leader 0.194 0.244 0.241 0.185 0.202 0.204
(0.22) (0.20) (0.19) (0.22) (0.20) (0.19)
Company—Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Stage 0.213* 0.223** 0.200** 0.198* 0.202* 0.169*
(0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10)
Year and Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 811 811 805 811 811 804
χ2 109.04 161.50 212.50 102.82 156.20 187.60
Model-p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.128 0.148 0.157 0.133 0.158 0.168Panel B: DOWNSIDE













IndependentVC 0.582** 0.636*** 0.580** 0.572** 0.615** 0.514**
(0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23)
VC—Age 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
VC—Size -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Syndicate—Follower 0.298 0.308 0.306 0.306 0.301 0.293
(0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Syndicate—Leader 0.117 0.122 0.155 0.090 0.100 0.105
(0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21)
Company—Age -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Stage 0.081 0.110 0.086 0.062 0.101 0.075
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Year and Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 926 926 920 926 926 919
χ2 72.06 71.57 78.28 69.96 78.95 87.39
Model-p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.105 0.116 0.126 0.107 0.126T a b l e6 :M a i nm o d e l :c o u n t r yﬁxed eﬀects
This Table reports results from (ordered) Probit regressions for our main model described in Section 5.2. The dependent
variables are INTERACTION in Panel A and DOWNSIDE in Panel B. For each Panel, columns (i) through (vi) report
estimates for models whose main independent variable is a diﬀerent measure of company, or investor, legal system. In
columns (i) through (iii) ((iv) through (vi)) investor (company) country ﬁxed eﬀects are included, but not reported.
All models include investor and deal controls. Investor controls are INDEPENDENTVC, VC—AGE, and VC—SIZE.
Deal Controls are COMPANY—AGE, STAGE, SYNDICATE—FOLLOWER, and SYNDICATE—LEADER (reported),
and DEAL—YEAR and INDUSTRY dummies (unreported). Variables are deﬁned in Section 4. For each independent
variable, we report the estimated coeﬃcient and the t-ratio (in parenthesis), computed using heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors, clustered by venture ﬁrm. Values signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identiﬁed by ***, **, *.
Panel A: INTERACTION













IndependentVC 0.442* 0.429* 0.436* 0.525** 0.495** 0.407*
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23)
VC—Age -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
VC—Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Syndicate—Follower -0.072 -0.080 -0.099 -0.010 -0.020 -0.064
(0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
Syndicate—Leader 0.302* 0.299* 0.285* 0.319** 0.292* 0.279*
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Company—Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Stage 0.178** 0.177** 0.178** 0.192** 0.180** 0.162*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Year and Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Investor country F.E. Yes Yes Yes No No No
Company country F.E. No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 811 811 805 811 811 804
χ2 596.76 613.99 444.80 201.35 242.04 236.50
Model-p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.220 0.219 0.220 0.191 0.198 0.215Panel B: DOWNSIDE













IndependentVC 0.637*** 0.644*** 0.644*** 0.676*** 0.671*** 0.597***
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
VC—Age 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.002 0.002 0.003*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
VC—Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Syndicate—Follower 0.282 0.294 0.287 0.304 0.295 0.277
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20)
Syndicate—Leader 0.159 0.171 0.182 0.180 0.174 0.168
(0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Company—Age -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Stage 0.080 0.082 0.075 0.065 0.065 0.059
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Year and Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Investor country F.E. Yes Yes Yes No No No
Company country F.E. No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 919 919 916 926 926 919
χ2 ♦♦♦139.79 147.96 143.45
Model-p-value ♦♦♦0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.208 0.208 0.213 0.197 0.197 0.200
♦ In columns (i) to (iii) of Panel B, Stata cannot compute the Chi-square test because of collinearity. However, if we
drop two of the investor-country ﬁxed eﬀects for smaller countries (such as Luxembourg and Portugal), this does not
aﬀect the signiﬁcance of any coeﬃcients, and the Chi-square test is computed (and is highly signiﬁcant).Table 7: Main model with partner US venture experience eﬀects
This Table reports results from (ordered) Probit regressions for our model with partner US venture experience eﬀects
described in Section 5.4. The dependent variables are INTERACTION in Panel A and DOWNSIDE in Panel B.
For each Panel, columns (i) through (vi) report estimates for models whose main independent variable is a diﬀerent
measure of company, or investor, legal systems. In columns (iv) through (vi) company country ﬁxed eﬀects are included,
but not reported. All models include investor and deal controls. Investor controls are INDEPENDENTVC, VC—
AGE, and VC—SIZE. Deal Controls are COMPANY—AGE, STAGE, SYNDICATE—FOLLOWER, and SYNDICATE—
LEADER (reported), and DEAL—YEAR and INDUSTRY dummies (unreported). Variables are deﬁned in Section 4.
For each independent variable, we report the estimated coeﬃcient and the t-ratio (in parenthesis), computed using
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by venture ﬁrm. Values signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are
identiﬁed by ***, **, *.
Panel A: INTERACTION







Partner—US—Experience 1.126** 0.985* 1.365** 1.426*** 1.347** 1.694***
(0.52) (0.53) (0.56) (0.54) (0.53) (0.58)
IndependentVC 0.509** 0.444** 0.356* 0.506** 0.481** 0.368*
(0.22) (0.21) (0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
VC—Age -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
VC—Size -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Syndicate—Follower -0.062 -0.040 -0.078 -0.009 -0.017 -0.077
(0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Syndicate—Leader 0.174 0.190 0.191 0.326** 0.304* 0.279*
(0.22) (0.21) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Company—Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Stage 0.202* 0.214* 0.174* 0.200** 0.191** 0.164*
(0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
Year and Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company country F.E. No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 792 792 785 792 792 785
χ2 123.19 164.66 220.00 252.73 283.06 339.97
Model-p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.145 0.166 0.198 0.211 0.217 0.242Panel B: DOWNSIDE







Partner—US—Experience 0.929 0.767 0.968* 1.120** 1.086** 1.274**
(0.61) (0.53) (0.52) (0.54) (0.50) (0.51)
IndependentVC 0.552** 0.614** 0.493** 0.635*** 0.635*** 0.537**
(0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
VC—Age 0.003 0.003 0.004** 0.002 0.002 0.003*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
VC—Size 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Syndicate—Follower 0.346 0.334 0.330 0.362* 0.354* 0.329*
(0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Syndicate—Leader 0.114 0.121 0.129 0.232 0.226 0.214
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21)
Company—Age -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Stage 0.051 0.099 0.066 0.042 0.047 0.031
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Year and Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company country F.E. No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 906 906 899 906 906 899
χ2 71.54 82.10 91.67 156.01 166.58 166.19
Model-p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.136 0.112 0.136 0.217 0.216 0.223Table 8: Main model: within-civil-law countries analysis
This Table reports results from (ordered) Probit regressions for our main model estimated with observations from civil
law countries only, described in Section 5.5. The dependent variables are INTERACTION in Panel A and DOWNSIDE
in Panel B. For each dependent variable, columns (i)-(ii) report estimates for models whose main independent variable is
INVESTOR—RULE and INVESTOR—PROCEDURAL. Columns (iii)-(iv) report estimates for models which also include
company country ﬁxed eﬀects. All models include investor and deal controls. Investor controls are INDEPENDENTVC,
VC—AGE, and VC—SIZE. Deal Controls are COMPANY—AGE, STAGE, SYNDICATE—FOLLOWER, and SYNDICATE—
LEADER (reported), and DEAL—YEAR and INDUSTRY dummies (unreported). Variables are deﬁned in Section 4.
For each independent variable, we report the estimated coeﬃcient and the t-ratio (in parenthesis), computed using
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by venture ﬁrm. Values signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are
identiﬁed by ***, **, *.
Panel A: INTERACTION





IndependentVC 0.405* 0.401* 0.492* 0.414
(0.23) (0.22) (0.26) (0.26)
VC—Age -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
VC—Size -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Syndicate—Follower 0.041 -0.023 0.070 -0.002
(0.23) (0.23) (0.21) (0.22)
Syndicate—Leader 0.100 0.085 0.180 0.179
(0.22) (0.21) (0.18) (0.17)
Company—Age 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Stage 0.162 0.157 0.151 0.164*
(0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Year and Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company country F.E. No No Yes Yes
Observations 636 629 636 629
χ2 127.63 203.17 251.52 255.23
Model-p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.150 0.174 0.198 0.214Panel B: DOWNSIDE





IndependentVC 0.608** 0.565** 0.782*** 0.732***
(0.27) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25)
VC—Age 0.003* 0.004** 0.003* 0.003**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
VC—Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Syndicate—Follower 0.413 0.402 0.407* 0.392*
(0.27) (0.27) (0.23) (0.22)
Syndicate—Leader 0.212 0.214 0.324 0.334
(0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23)
Company—Age -0.001* -0.001* -0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Stage 0.088 0.081 0.098 0.104
(0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09)
Year and Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company country F.E. No No Yes Yes
Observations 747 740 747 740
χ2 59.94 59.81 80.97 78.69
Model-p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.105 0.110 0.197 0.195Table 9: Main model with diﬀerent securities
This Table reports results from (ordered) probit regressions for our model with diﬀerent securities described in Section
5.6. The dependent variables are CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED in Panel A, DEBT in Panel B, and EQUITY in Panel
C. For each dependent variable, columns (i) through (iii) report estimates for models whose main independent variable
is INVESTOR—COMMON, INVESTOR—RULE, and INVESTOR—PROCEDURAL. Columns (iv) through (vi) report
estimates for models which also include company country ﬁxed eﬀects. All models include investor and deal controls.
Investor controls are INDEPENDENTVC, VC—AGE, and VC—SIZE. Deal Controls are COMPANY—AGE, STAGE,
SYNDICATE—FOLLOWER, and SYNDICATE—LEADER (reported), and DEAL—YEAR and INDUSTRY dummies
(unreported). Variables are deﬁned in Section 4. For each independent variable, we report the estimated coeﬃcient and
the t-ratio (in parenthesis), computed using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by venture ﬁrm. Values
signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identiﬁed by ***, **, *.
Panel A: CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED







IndependentVC 0.476* 0.488** 0.416* 0.623*** 0.615** 0.554**
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25)
VC—Age 0.003* 0.003* 0.004** 0.003* 0.003* 0.003*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
VC—Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Syndicate—Follower 0.415* 0.419* 0.414* 0.419** 0.411** 0.398*
(0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Syndicate—Leader 0.280 0.285 0.296 0.367* 0.355* 0.360*
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Company—Age -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Stage 0.083 0.106 0.089 0.096 0.091 0.093
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Year and Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company country F.E. No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 926 926 919 922 922 915
χ2 75.08 74.00 75.34 147.68 130.53 133.32
Model-p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.109 0.106 0.115 0.193 0.196 0.195Panel B: DEBT







IndependentVC 0.412* 0.475** 0.338* 0.259 0.282 0.241
(0.21) (0.23) (0.20) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
VC—Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
VC—Size 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Syndicate—Follower -0.118 -0.106 -0.121 -0.127 -0.118 -0.141
(0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Syndicate—Leader -0.341 -0.331 -0.325 -0.313 -0.285 -0.333
(0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
Company—Age 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Stage -0.036 0.017 -0.024 -0.066 -0.047 -0.077
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Year and Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company country F.E. No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 926 926 919 886 886 879
χ2 66.12 49.94 60.11 225.15 193.12 233.24
Model-p-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.109 0.078 0.111 0.135 0.127 0.143Panel C: EQUITY







IndependentVC 0.084 -0.035 0.085 -0.028 0.018 0.110
(0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
VC—Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
VC—Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Syndicate—Follower -0.687*** -0.671*** -0.685*** -0.738*** -0.740*** -0.722***
(0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
Syndicate—Leader -0.343* -0.341* -0.363* -0.507*** -0.476** -0.516***
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Company—Age 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Stage -0.006 -0.055 -0.038 -0.037 -0.014 -0.024
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Year and Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company country F.E. No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 922 922 915 833 833 823
χ2 64.07 62.56 64.24 119.80 139.13 128.80
Model-p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.136 0.105 0.122 0.190 0.209 0.204